Introduction
The rise of forced migration-of refugees, the internally displaced, and those escaping endemic poverty-as an increasingly prominent feature of the 'developing' world's social landscape has been accompanied by a growing recognition that the short and long-term socio-economic effects of forced migration are not only limited to those compelled into flight. While the links among forced migration, aid, and refugee communities' changing socio-economic foundations have attracted a growing amount of attention, many questions remained unanswered (see Hyndman 2000; Stepputat 1999; Malkki 1995 Malkki , 1992 Colson 1971) . Among the most politically charged of these are explorations of the effects of refugees' survival strategies and humanitarian aid on the existing physical and social environments in which they intersect. Inspired in part by Chambers' (1993) pithily entitled, 'Hidden Losers' article, a group of scholars are now directing their attention to how the arrival of refugees and aid-what I call a humanitarian influx-affects locals living outside refugee camps or inter-mixing with high densities of the displaced. While furthering our understanding of forced migration, these inquiries have largely drawn attention to these influxes' short-term impacts (see Damme & al. 1998; Jacobsen 1997; Black 1994; Kuhlman 1991; Kok 1989; Hansen & Oliver-Smith 1982) . Moreover, the nexus of the current debate-determining whether the aggregate effects on host populations are positive or 11 An earlier version of this paper was first presented at the negative-leaves us needing an elaborate index of gains and losses and considerably more longitudinal data than are typically available for the often remote and poor areas involved. While past work has made important empirical contributions, it has left what may be more fundamentally significant and transformatory outcomes unrecognised.
Recent work-notably by Jacobsen (2002) , Whitaker (1999) , and Waters (1999) -illustrates the value in exploring the often more subtle and longer-term influences refugees and humanitarian relief have on host communities' socio-economic configurations. As all three of these authors note, these shifts' genesis is found in the considerable material and rhetorical resources influxes typically inject into what are often politically and economically peripheral areas. Echoing Chambers' earlier assertion, both Whitaker and Waters' inquiries into western Tanzania communities detail how particular hosts use these resources to their economic advantage while shifting economic exchange patterns further impoverishes others. Neither of these works, however, goes far beyond Chamber's original assertion that some members of the host population gain while others (perhaps the majority)
lose.
In examining the effects of central African refugees on the economy of one Western Tanzania district, this paper strives to look beyond the influx's short-term impacts and engage with a broader set of debates about the nature of the African peasantry. To do this it employs a metric borrowed from Marxist work on rural transformation. Working from the presupposition that most rural Tanzanians largely rely on petty-agricultural, this article is primarily concerned with whether the influx has precipitated a modal transformation: a significant and potentially lasting move towards integration in regional or national markets. This analytical lens challenges local understandings of the influx's shortterm material effects while providing insights into processes that are more theoretically and empirically significant than temporary price distortions or opportunities for temporary employment.
In the first instance, this analysis questions the widely assumed causal link between the influx of Burundian and Congolese refugees and aid into Western Tanzania and that region's prices rises, changing employment patterns, and increased trade. It goes on to demonstrate that while there have indeed been economic effects, most of these changes have been in sectors affecting only a small percentage of the region's host population. What signs there are of a transformation, moreover, are not towards commodification or market integration, as both Marxist theory and Tanzanian government pronouncements would lead us to expect. Rather, perceptions of influx-related inflation, market volatility, and physical insecurity are at least temporarily suppressed residents' willingness to participate in commodity or labor markets. If there has been a change, it is that Kasulu residents are instead more vigourously exercising their 'exit option' from the cash and waged economy (see Hirschman 1970; also Gibbon 1995; Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1990; Hyden 1980) . Rather than the influx encouraging incorporation into a national, market-based economy, appear to be increasing the likelihood of Kasulu residents relying on tested forms of subsistence agricultural production and localised, petty trade.
Apart from documenting an emerging empirical reality, this inquiry is important for at least two theoretical reasons. First, it draws attention to the influence of domestic, in this case Tanzanian, policy on an influx's lasting material effects. In doing so it confirms Jacobsen's (2002) assertion that even governments with feeble administrative systems-a category to which Tanzania undeniably belongs-may exert considerable influence on the behavior of relatively rich international bodies.
While policy formulated in Dar es Salaam has not always strictly determined administrative practice in the country's refugee-affected areas (c.f. Pressman 1973), government policies continue to be critical influences on refugee settlement patterns, the form of relief distribution, international agencies' behavior within Tanzania, and the sites in which they operate. Although unplanned, the demographic configurations and patterns of resource flows resulting from domestic policy are in large part responsible for the effects the influx has engendered.
Second, while this paper draws heavily from a rural political economy perspective, by highlighting the role of historical contingency it challenges the kind of mechanistic thinking which often informs this field. Structuralist writing generally predicts that increased population and an influx of material resources will shift the local population's patterns of economic production: from petty, peasant agriculture towards the market and cash economy (see, for example, Bernstein 1982; Moore 1966; Marx 1950b; Polanyi 1957) . 2 Some post-structuralist authors-particularly those critical of the 'western aid regime'-fortify these expectations by arguing that the critical involvement of international aid or relief agencies will, for better or worse, tend to propagate uniquely 'western', often market-oriented, logics and practices (see Stepputat 1999; Hyndman 1996; Escobar 1995 , Malkki 1995 . Given these arguments, these theories are likely to predict a move away from self-reliance and petty production towards marketisation: the extension of capitalist and exchange logics into areas previously characterised by self-sufficiency and localised production. In fact, the evidence points towards changes to the contrary.
Evaluating Economic Transformation: Indicators of Change and Research Design
Based on theory and experiences elsewhere in the world, there are good reasons to expect that a significant humanitarian influx should induce a significant transformation in the region's material relations and disciplines. In the current case, the World Food Programme's food distribution programme alone (covering four Western Tanzanian districts) was a million dollar a week operation (Ward 1999:int.) . This says nothing of the resources brought in or exchanged by other aspects of the relief operation or by refugees and aid workers. While not all of these resources reached Kasulu district, even those that did dwarfed the district administration's annual budget of approximately 1.8 million dollars (Mutamba 2000:int.) . 3 The influx's demographic weight also made it a particularly suitable candidate for overcoming many of the most cited factors that have retarded marketisation in Africa's rural areas. The refugee camps' proximity to Tanzanian villages, for example, not only provided a ready local market for agricultural products but would also, due to the refugees' desperation, appear to offer a massive and untapped source of inexpensive labor.
Drawing from modernist theory and classical Marxism, I take increased marketisation or selfsufficiency as my primary measures of modal transformation (see Marx 1950a Marx , 1950b Weber 1976; Rostow 1960; Bernstein 1981) . When it occurs, marketisation represents a dramatic shift in villagers' economic engagements from family based production and highly local trade and barter to a supralocal, cash based economy. One must also allow for the possibility of increased localisation of production and self-reliance.
The indicators used here to gauge economic transformation-inflation, magnitude of trade, use of labor, general wealth, and participation in the market (versus self-sufficiency)-are imprecise to be sure. Taken together, however, they provide a general outline of transformational pressures and changing economic practices. For example, rapid inflation combined with increased trade, use of labor, and market participation are all likely signs of a move from relative self-sufficiency to a more market oriented economy. Taken individually, these indicators are still valuable in pointing to the sources and nature of change. Rapid increases in real costs, for example, suggest strong demands on existing resources and pressures for increased market-oriented production.
Identifying and describing a region's changing economic and material conditions does not in itself allow the observer to isolate an influx's causal effects. In a country undergoing rapid macroeconomic de jure and de facto 'liberalization', making such determinations is particularly difficult. To address this challenge, this study uses Mill's 'method of difference' (see King & al. 1994; Lieberson 1994) to undertake a longitudinal comparison of shifting material practices in two generally similar 
The Humanitarian Influx in Fact and Policy
Understanding the causal links between a humanitarian influx and host communities' changing practices requires at least a preliminary understanding of pre-influx conditions, the magnitude of the current influx, and the actors and policy decisions that structured that influx (for more detailed background to the history of refugees in Western Tanzania, see Sommers 2001; Rutinwa 1996; Malkki 1995 , Armstrong 1988 Burundian Hutus chose to flee the country. As a result of the conflicts, there were between 200,000 and 300,000 officially registered Burundian refugees in Tanzania by late 1999, almost all in internationally managed camps (see Table 1) in Southern or Northeastern Tanzania. There also were almost 100,000 Burundians still residing at various locations in Tanzania. 5 The forced repatriation of the Rwandans was, and remains, a controversial policy. It was widely decried by human rights organisations as a refoulment and a human rights violation by the Tanzanian government even though it was undertaken with the blessing of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the organisation appointed by the international community to protect refugee welfare and rights (a joint policy statement between the UNHCR and the Government of Tanzania was issued on 2 December 1996 announcing the policy). 6 The Burundian government refers to these settlements as 'regroupment camps'. While the government remains secretive about camp conditions-which escapees report to be abominable-the policy itself has been carried out quite publicly. A number of these camps are visible with the naked eye from the Tanzanian border. The real number of Burundians living in Tanzania during this period was considerably higher, perhaps reaching 400,000 to 500,000. The collapse of Mobutu's Zaïre in the late 1990s and the subsequent conflicts in the Northeastern sections of the newly renamed Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (formerly Zaïre) also resulted in considerable human displacement and an increased number of asylum seekers in Western Tanzania. In the seven years between 1993 and 2000, the country received and hosted almost 1,500,000 refugees, most concentrated in Western Tanzania (Kagera and Kigoma regions). Kasulu district, one of three rural districts in Kigoma Region, has been a major destination for refugees from both DRC and Burundi (see Table 1 ). As further illustration of the magnitude of the post-1994 influx, it is worth noting that in the more than thirty years between 1961 and 1993, Tanzania hosted about 400,000 refugees in 20 settlements throughout the country.
Combined, Kigoma and Kagera regions have an estimated population of around 2,500,000
Tanzanian citizens. The presence of 500,000 plus refugees means that one sixth of the two regions' total residents are non-citizens. The ratio is even more pronounced in Kasulu district where an estimated host population of 320,000 shares the district with over 140,000 officially recognised
refugees. Ignoring what may be an additional 60,000 Burundians living outside of the camps, over a quarter of Kasulu's current residents are non-Tanzanian nationals. Any population increase of this 7 All demographic figures, both those provided in this chart and those given later for the Tanzanian population, should be read as informed estimates. Refugee populations are notoriously difficult to quantify and the counting process is often highly politicised (see Harrell-Bond, & al. 1992; Crisp 1999b magnitude is likely to affect existing local practices. The fact that a quarter of the district's population is comprised of expatriates housed in densely populated camps supported by a multi-million dollar international relief effort makes some form of change all but inevitable.
It is useful to revisit a number of key assertions by way of summary. First, while Kasulu-and indeed much of western Tanzania-has hosted central African refugees for much of the last forty years, the post 1994 influx in many ways represents a qualitative shift in the scale and nature of human displacement and the relief operations they triggered. Where 'old case load' refugees either self-settled amongst Tanzanian villagers or were housed in purpose built settlements largely separated, both geographically and socially, from their Tanzanian hosts, the new refugees are in temporary camps in close proximity to Tanzanian villagers. This has had important implications for host communities.
While economic interaction between the refugees and Tanzanians occurred during previous inflows, nowhere where the concentrations of refugees high enough or their settlements in close enough proximity to host communities to fundamentally transform existing patterns of material exchange. The remainder of this paper seeks to determine if even this massive humanitarian influx has hastened market integration and precipitated a shift away from localised petty trade.
Challenge without Transformation
The new caseload's apparent effects are readily visible in the refugee-affected areas' economic and physical landscape. Understanding the nature and cause of these effects, however, requires careful attention. The following section asks three questions in this regard. First, does the available evidence justify Tanzanian government claims that its citizens living outside the camps have, on aggregate, borne substantial economic and environmental costs resulting from the humanitarian influx? In addressing this query, this section also asks whether the effects are an inherent and unavoidable effect of an influx of this magnitude, or if they are linked to official policy structuring the relief effort. The third question-and the one most directly tied to this paper's overarching concernis whether these observed changes constitute a fundamental or 'modal' shift in practice or if they are merely temporary distortions in Kasulu residents' patterns of production and material exchange.
There are sound reasons to expect that Kasulu's humanitarian influx would lead to local residents' further engagement in supra-local material exchange and market logics. First, the failure of past economic and marketing initiatives meant that before the influx, residents' involvement in supralocal markets tended to be occasional and limited (see Gibbon 1995; Hyden 1980) . For perfectly rational reasons, the peasantry, in Hyden's famous words, remained uncaptured. It would, therefore, not be surprising to local residents embrace market-oriented behaviors when faced with the new structural incentives associated with Kasulu's humanitarian influx. Increases in population-up by over 20% in five years-and resource flows in and out of the district would seem to provide the incentives to make such a shift. As noted earlier, the World Food Programme's (WFP) refugee-feeding operation alone brought resources worth a million dollars into Western Tanzania (Kigoma and Kagera regions) every week for a period of years. Expenditures from other aspects of the relief operation, the presence of new, resource rich actors (NGOs, the UN, aid workers), and improved transportation infrastructure further raised the specter of inflation and possibilities for commodification and supralocal exchange.
Many observers and aid-practitioners also note how a massive influx (like Kasulu's) typically encourages marketisation through expanding opportunities for trade, hiring labor, and direct employment (see Waters 1999; Whitaker 1999; Daley 1993; Christensen 1985) . Not only do refugees often sell large portions of their aid disbursements (e.g., food, blankets, cooking implements, and the ubiquitous blue tarpaulins), but their presence also invariably heightens demand for other goods and services. When there are restrictions on refugees' income generating activities, as there are in Tanzania, they are often forced to compete (illegally) for waged jobs. While potentially suppressing wages and discouraging local's participation in the labor market, lower labor costs may provide smallscale agricultural producers with opportunities to expand income-generating activities. Furthermore, an influx offers permanent residents new employment opportunities: with international organizations and NGOs; as domestic help for well-paid aid workers; or in one of the new businesses started to serve these affluent outsiders. Combined with higher costs for food and cooking fuel, these may well provide additional pressures for commodification. The following paragraphs explore these pressures and their effects on local material exchange.
Economic Practices and Disciplines
Inflation: The demand of meeting basic material needs is a universal determinant of human behavior. Rapid increases in prices for food and shelter will, therefore, almost necessarily have significant practical consequences for those relying on such commodities. Similarly, the depletion of essential natural resources will effectively require people to relocate or acquire those goods through other-usually market-mechanisms. Preliminary evidence suggests that the humanitarian influx has provided such pressures, resulting in skyrocketing prices and resource scarcity. One Kasulu villager reflects such concerns:
Before the refugees arrived, this was a beautiful place, we had so many trees, there was fresh water and we had all of the crops and livestock that we needed . . . Now many people have to travel far to their farms and there is much illness, and prices for our needs have gone up dramatically. A goat five years ago was 2-3,000 shillings, now it is 10-15,000 (Kohoye 2000:int.) .
an 89% increase for chickens. In an official document, the Tanzanian Government also claims that between 1993 and 1996, prices for a kilogram of beans climbed from 200 to 500 shillings (83% per year) and carrots from 500 to 2,000 (133% per year) in the country's refugee-affected areas (United Republic of Tanzania 1997: xii). Following a self-destructive corollary to the notion of the 'rational peasantry' (see Popkin 1979), the Tanzanian Government goes on to argue that these higher food prices encouraged overselling, resulting in widespread food insecurity and heightened dependence on supra-local markets (Republic of Tanzania 1997: xiii). 10 Others cite massive increases in the prices paid for rental property as an indicator of substantive economic change (see, for example, Waters 1999).
Evaluating the sources of Kasulu's dramatic price rises is one task for which cross-district comparison is essential. If prices in the two research districts followed the same curve, for example, one could confidently dismiss Government claims of influx-related inflation. Unfortunately, despite queries to the district, regional, and national Agriculture Departments, it proved impossible to obtain district level data on commodity prices. Even so, it is still possible to carefully consider the causal reasoning behind these claims-and their effects on locals' daily lives-in light of available data. For example, because very few of Kasulu's permanent residents live in rental housing and even fewer own property suitable for rent to aid workers, real rises in the rates for rental housing and office space are only likely to be really felt by international organizations, NGOs, and their relatively well-paid staffs (both Tanzanian and international). Despite massive increases in the rents charged for 'upmarket'
properties in Kasulu town, the price for village property or building materials does not appear to have increased.
11 Such a shift is not, therefore, likely to challenge the district's prevailing economic practices.
It is more difficult to dismiss, a priori, changing food prices. While food shortages may have occurred in some refugee-areas and malnutrition is a recurrent problem, there is nothing concretely linking these problems with the refugees. No one with whom I spoke, for example, indicated that they had gone without food as a result of trading with refugees or, for that matter, that they were selling 10 Whitaker (1999) supports this claim, arguing that in Kagera and Kibondo prices for cassava and cooking bananas have skyrocketed and, citing an FAO report (FAO 1995) , that such increases have indeed led to food shortages. Intra-family gender dynamics may help explain this seemingly implausible set of actions. Men, who typically make most decisions regarding cash-sales, are not usually responsible for meeting the family's nutritional needs. While women may prefer to store grain for scarcer times, men are consequently more prone to capitalise on opportunities for quick gain. more agricultural products to anyone than they had in years past. Much as raising rents may only effect those already relying on the cash economy, the high degree to which Kasulu's local residentslike most Tanzanian villagers-are nutritionally self-reliant has probably also served to temper the district's price rises' practical effects.
While my own attempts to collect retrospective data on commodity prices (presented here as Accepting its very serious limitations (see Footnote 11), Table 2 demonstrates that average prices for a typical basket of foodstuffs in Kasulu differ by only about 5% from those in Mpwapwa, a difference that might be dismissed as sampling error. Working on the assumption that Mpwapwa and Kasulu residents control the same financial resources (see Table 3 , far below), it would be incorrect to conclude that Kasulu residents who are currently buying marketed goods do so at a significant disadvantage. Conversely, Kasulu's markets provide no great advantage to those selling agricultural commodities. This index is based on a basket of goods including 1.5kg of Maize, 1 kg or beans, and a whole goat. Average prices for maize and beans were totaled and added to 10% of the price of a whole goat (to avoid the goat price dominating the index). The sample sizes for the various products vary greatly, from 3 for 1990 maize prices in
Mpwapwa to 10 for current bean prices (10 was the target sample size). In all cases, not more than 5 people were able to provide price information for commodities sold in 1990. All information was collected from vendors in the districts' largest markets, the Sunday market in Mpwapwa (June 2000) and the 'New Market' in Kasulu (October 2000). An effort was made to collect information on cassava prices but no more than 3 people could be found selling cassava.
300-500% between the harvest season, when supply is most plentiful, and planting season, when it is most scarce (Mnzava 2000:int.) . Discussions with Kasulu shopkeepers indicate that goat prices are also known to jump almost 1,000% in the days before Idd el Fitr when the animals are most in demand. These shifts' severity and rapidity-which are obviously not influx-related-are likely to have a far greater impact on an average citizen's spending power and economic planning than slower longitudinal increases. These seasonal variations also illustrate the markets' ability to tolerate rapid price fluctuations without permanent structural change.
Given the Government of Tanzania's interest in demonstrating the influx's negative effects on surrounding communities, their figures (for beans and carrots, cited above) may represent these seasonal (i.e., temporary) distortions, carefully selected to show maximal change, and not long-term trends. While Table 2 This meant that many goods priced at 175 shillings just before the influx sold for over 800 shillings a decade later, an absolute increase of almost 600 shillings. With lagging wage adjustments, substantial cuts in public spending for social services, the introduction of cost sharing for schools and hospitals, and the reintroduction of local development levies, these jumps have had tremendous effects on Tanzanians throughout the country (see Tripp 1997) . 13 More importantly for current purposes, the devalued shilling accounts for most of the district's inflation since 1995.
It is also important to consider the ways general environmental conditions have affected food availability and prices for basic commodities. As UNICEF's representative in Kasulu, Severin Kabakama, notes:
The real problem with food security over the last few years has had very little to do with the refugees. There are some positive benefits. I, myself, worked as a radio operator for World Vision, before coming to the University and during our vacation times. Many people get jobs with relief organizations, but Tanzania is a wide country . . . The problem is people who are near the camps are not getting the employment. If they get it, it is as security guards and cleaners (Kitambwa 1999:int.) .
There are at least three reasons why permanent Kasulu residents have not capitalised extensively from new employment opportunities. First, these organizations hire relatively few people compared with the district's population. There are, to make a generous estimation, maybe 1,000 people directly employed by Kasulu's aid and relief organizations (most of those employed in the camps are refugees). Even if all of these were Tanzanians, which they are not, they still represent a tiny fraction of the district's approximately 200,000 working-age adults. Although the benefits for those who are employed are subsequently redistributed through family and kin networks-or perhaps because of this-these jobs' effects remain remarkably limited. Including secondary employmentlocals hired by well-paid aid workers to wash, cook, clean, etc.-expands the sphere of influence somewhat, but also does not point to widespread transformation. These secondary positions are, after all, only truly available to the small number of people who can walk or cycle to their employers' residences and the payment is relatively low. Only rarely have these wages enable locals to make substantial capital investments in land or productive machines. While these opportunities may help improve or transform individuals' lives, they will not affect a modal shift in the district's economic 15 In another way that the government has sought advantage from the influx, Tanzanian labor law requires that after a certain period, most jobs must be offered to a Tanzanian national. In order to maintain good relations with the Tanzanian government (and to lower labor costs), many organisations have adopted such policies as their own standard operating procedures.
practice, bring people into a supra-local labor market, or encourage them to abandon their primary subsistence oriented activities. Table 3 ).
The general employment profiles for Mpwapwa and Kasulu's residents are almost identical, a further indicator that new employment opportunities have not induced a shift in the primary means of economic production (see Table 3 ). Although less so than in years past, south Asians are also well represented. The preponderance of 'foreign' business owners indicates that the economic advantages garnered from the influx are considerably less likely to reach Kasulu's native residents and, consequently, unlikely to have significant influence on their economic practices.
Despite influx related changes, informal trade and agriculture remain Kasulu resident's economic lifeblood. While a trade embargo and continued insecurity in Burundi has probably decreased cross-border trade, many assert that local (as opposed to trans-border) trade has increased as Kasulu's population has grown. A number of highly visible illustrate the emergence of influx-related practices. In the hours following the WFP's bi-monthly food distribution, bicycles carrying impossibly heavy sacks of yellow maize can be seen streaming out of the camp gates. Those exiting Mtabila
Camp typically head directly to Mugombe village (2km away) where the bags-many still emblazoned with 'Gift of USA: Not for Sale' -are loaded onto waiting trucks for transport to markets elsewhere in the country. Other sacks are carried to Kasulu where they are sold through local market mechanisms. Many Tanzanians also participate in two-times weekly markets held just outside of the camps where agricultural commodities and locally made beer are traded and they supply the small shops and kiosks operating within the camps themselves (Chuleha 1999:int.) . In Kanazi village, 10km from the refugee camps by footpath (further by road), refugees are regular participants in the village's market, often selling part or all of the goods they have received as aid (maize, blankets, blue tarps, etc.).
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These trading practices are superficially indicative of a deeper economic change and many local observers have assumed that they represent increased integration into supra-local economic networks. Although this has undoubtedly occurred to a certain extent, such conclusions must be severely qualified. While significant to the individuals involved, the aggregate effects of such trade are not impressive. When asked if general business conditions had substantially changed since the influx, the Kanazi (Kasulu) village chairman responded that the refugees' presence was nominally beneficial to trade, but that over the past five years practical changes had not been that great (Dilunga 1999:int.) .
This sentiment was seconded by a Kanazi schoolteacher and businessman (interviewed informally in his shop during school hours) who dismissed the possibility that the refugees were a significant source of economic change:
The refugees have nothing, so they only come to sell what they are given. Maybe they buy a few things, but not much. They don't buy clothes, only some food, and not much of that. You know, if you have a family of five, you can buy enough cassava to feed all of them for a day for about 100 shillings [app. $0.15]. You don't get rich selling things for 100 shillings (Kasulu, 17.12.1999).
As suggested earlier, trade with the refugees has created temporary price distortions and generally increased the amount of goods and money changing hands, but it has not had a transformatory effect on even those villages closest to the camps. As one moves further from the camps' boundaries, these effects become even less consequential. While the money changing hands is great by local standards, the wholesalers and major buyers are typically either residents of other districts or newcomers to Kasulu. Villagers are able to participate in this trade primarily as intermediaries and their profits are, therefore, quite limited.
One must also consider the possibility that 'surplus' refugee labor has enabled the host population to expand their own agricultural production and sales. Whitaker's 1999 study suggests that refugees provide a cheap (albeit illegal) source of labor for clearing land, building houses, minding livestock, or (particularly) harvesting local residents' crops. Even though 75% of the refugees are paid in-kind (rather than cash), Whitaker maintains that the financial effects of this are significant: Farmers expanded their farms and sold more crops for cash. The manager of Kasulu's newly privatised tobacco company (DIMON) supports these claims, reporting in an interview that since the influx began, many of the district's farmers are expanding their tobacco production by using refugee labor (Mbena 1999:int.) . If this is true, a transformation may be taking place. While the refugees' eventual departure 17 Sale of these blue tarpaulins has become an important income generator for the refugees and they can now be seen throughout the country. Indeed, my guesthouse in Mpwapwa-almost 2000km away-was well equipped with table umbrellas fashioned from these materials.
would certainly reduce the future availability of and reliance on cheap labor, their extended stay may allow farmers to accumulate sufficient capital to shift permanently from petty-agriculture to cash crop production or some other form of economic activity. A conversion of land and resources for cash cropping at the expense of subsistence activities could also help 'lock-in' incentive structures for the continuation of an expanded market for wage labor, something that has not previously existed.
A number of factors give cause to question whether inexpensive refugee labor is in fact behind a substantial transformation in Tanzanians' economic practices. At the most basic level, restrictions on refugees' economic activity limit their ability to spend time away from the camps. While many move beyond the official 3km perimeter set by the government, the threat of punishment undoubtedly suppresses the amount of economic activity outside the camps' boundaries. Growing insecurity in the areas surrounding the refugee camps has also acted as a brake on Tanzanians expanding agriculture production. As one Kasulu villager notes:
Some people may have the ability to farm up to ten acres, they can hire labor and they have the land. Then, they go out and plant the farm and tend the crops and just before the harvest, the refugees come and take everything. It is as if they have done nothing. So, next time, they don't plant so much (Mugombe, 29.02.01, i) .
The effects of growing fear go beyond crop damage. Interviews suggest that to ensure their personal safety farmers-who are mainly women-must now travel in groups, further limiting the area that can be farmed and potentially negating the productive potential of using refugee labor (Kitambwa 1999:int; Mtumwa 2000:int; Kohoye 2000:int.) .
One might also question the extent to which the refugee presence has swollen the local labor force. While the fact that very few respondents admitted to contracting refugee labor is not surprising-it is after all illegal-interviews indicate that over the last five years (i.e., since the start of the influx) the amount of the labor hired by Kasulu residents has not substantially increased.
Moreover, interviews with villagers indicate that the rate at which they employ labor does not significantly differ from Mpwapwa (see Tables 4 and 5 ). It is also important that wages paid to Kasulu's day workers are also not noticeably lower than in Mpwapwa as one would expect given a labor surplus. Production statistics for tobacco, Kasulu's most significant cash crop, are perhaps the most damning challenge to assertions that refugee labor is the engine powering marketisation and the shift from petty-agriculture to cash crop production (see Table 6 ). While the DIMON manager asserts that farmers are making extensive use of refugee labor (Mbena 2000:int.) , this cheap labor does not seem to have overcome other structural and technical weaknesses in the Tobacco market. Instead of a positive correlation between the availability of labor and increased 18 Totals do not equal 100 due to rounding. 19 The shilling has devalued from around 550 to the dollar in 1998 to 810 to the dollar in 2000. This makes the decline shown in the Table Six even more severe. commercial agricultural activity, production seems more closely linked to falling real prices for Tobacco (given inflation and currency devaluation) and environmental conditions. The fact that only 388 farmers participated in Tobacco production in 1999, with only 802 acres under cultivation may mean, moreover, that any significance afforded to levels of tobacco production is misplaced. 20 That tobacco remains the district's largest cash crop despite declining participation and production serves as further indication of the district's paltry levels of income-generating activity and the extremely limited marketisation that has taken place since the influx.
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The previous sub-section demonstrates that while the influx has undoubtedly influenced Kasulu's economic practices, its effects have not been fundamentally transformatory and have not led to a significantly greater integration into supra-local exchange relationships. In fact, the observed changes-to employment, the use of labor, and agriculture-reveal isolated, limited, and temporary distortions, not structural change. A brief, concluding look into changes in Mpwapwa and Kasulu districts' general economic conditions provides further support for this position. 20 The peak number of participants occurred in 1997/98 when DIMON distributed both seeds and farming implements. Many of these implements were, according to Mbena (2000:int.) , later sold for short-term cash gains. The sale of the implements, however, limited the farmers' ability to produce tobacco in subsequent years. 21 With funding from a consortium of UN agencies, the Diocese of Western Tanganyika is making a concerted effort to increase the cash cropping of beans in Kasulu district. In exchange for funding, the WFP has agreed to buy surplus beans at a fixed price that it will then give to the refugees. The idea is to eventually expand this programme to include farmers throughout the district. As of yet, this programme is in its initial stages and has only limited participation. If it catches on, it could create significant changes in economic practice, although if the WFP and the refugees leave, such a shift is unlikely (Sarr 1999:int; Detiger 2000:int.) . Given the fact that Kasulu ranks as one of the country's poorest districts in both United Nations and Tanzanian Government statistics, it is not surprising that Kasulu villagers report a slightly lower standard of socio-economic welfare (Mpwapwa appears a bit better off in most statistics). The standards of living in both districts are, however, generally comparable. Table 7 points to two other important characteristics of the respective sample groups. First, the similarity of the possessions claimed suggests that both groups participate in similar economic activities. Were, for example, Kasulu residents more market oriented as a result of an influx-induced transformation, they would be more likely to report significant numbers of sewing machines, workshops, and grinders. (The last of these could prove quite profitable given the tons (literally) of effectively inedible whole grain flooding into the district on a bi-weekly basis.) The only substantial difference between the two districts, however, is Kasulu residents' proclivity for bicycles over radios. Given the economic potential of bicycle ownership (e.g., the transportation of goods and commodities, additional employment opportunities garnered from commuting capacity), this could suggest a move away from agriculture 22 The index was formed in the following way. Respondents were read a list of items that rural Tanzanians might typically possess. If they answered that they or someone with whom they lived had the item, their response was coded as 'owns'. If they had acquired that item in the last five years, their response was also coded as 'new'. In this way, the index is intended to demonstrate both general levels of material wealth and changes in economic status. The 'totals' were formed respectively by adding the percentage of people possessing items, and the percentage of people acquiring something new. These indices are unsubtle and problematic, but are indicative and provide some comparative reference. 23 In evaluating self-reporting of increased farm size, Koloseni (1999:int.) warns that when people say the size of their farm has increased, they do not necessarily mean that they have expanded production. Often claims of increased farm size will simply indicate that new land has been cleared. and towards small business. The fact that over a quarter of cycle owners had acquired them in the last year might also speak to this. One can, however, plausibly explain this difference with by Mpwapwa's slightly more extensive public transportation network and residents' somewhat less acute need for bicycles. Evidence from my survey of secondary school students provides further evidence of the fundamental similarity in the two districts' current economic fortunes and transformational trajectories. Were a transformation in Kasulu's economic foundations taking place, one would expect to see either a great deal of optimism or pessimism as respondents looked forward to an uncertain but dynamic future. Table 8 does not support such a hypothesis. Despite Kasulu's humanitarian influx engendering structural conditions that have elsewhere precipitated commodification, market integration, and agricultural transformation-higher population densities, improved infrastructure, and suppressed labor prices-there is no strong evidence indicating any form of material transformation (towards commodification or self-reliance). If anything, it appears as though the influx has at least temporarily suppressed residents' willingness to participate in commodity or labor markets. Rather than the influx encouraging them to become more deeply incorporated into a national, market-based economy, perceptions of influx-related inflation, market volatility, and physical insecurity may be increasing the likelihood of Kasulu residents relying on tested forms of subsistence agricultural production and highly localised, petty trade. Such practices may potentially result in Kasulu's permanent residents' further disengagement from regional or national markets. Whatever the influx-related effects may ultimately be-towards commodification or increased self-reliance-one cannot dismiss the importance of the Tanzanian government's choice to use camps, place them in close proximity to villages and the Burundian border, and restrict refugee employment.
Conclusions: The Perception and 'Reality' of Changing Material Practice
This essay confirms two assertions often made about Western Tanzania's contemporary political economy. First, that the humanitarian influx has had both positive and negative benefits. The balance of these will largely be determined by the metrics one employs and the sub-population group in which one is interested. Whether the effects of a comparable influx would be similar in a different environment depends, as Chambers (1993) Gibbon 1995; Maliyamkono & Bagachwa 1990; Hyden 1980) . Rather than the influx encouraging them to become more deeply incorporated into a national, market-based economy, perceptions of influx-related inflation, market volatility, and physical insecurity may be increasing the likelihood of Kasulu residents relying on tested forms of subsistence agricultural production and highly localised, petty trade. This does not necessary mean that they subscribe to an 'economy of affection' nor that they are driven mechanically by economic incentives. Rather, economic rationality, perception, rhetoric, and habit all appear to be contributing to local communities' response to the influx. This article's findings also demonstrate, if largely implicitly, that even in a country as impoverished as Tanzania, state elites have important roles, however indirectly, in structuring the lives and livelihoods of their country's citizens. While policies formed in Africa's national capitals are not likely to achieve their intended effects in rural areas, local and national government officials and agencies still exert considerable influence on domestic economic policies and decisions about the placement and allocations of refugees and aid. A government decision to take no action when faced with a humanitarian emergency or to manipulate of donors and donor resources may also have significant, if not always predictable, effects on remote rural populations.
As a final comment, this paper demonstrates the importance of carefully interrogating claims-by aid workers, relief agencies, governments, and the refugees themselves-about the causal effects of humanitarian influx on communities living near refugee camps or amongst high concentrations of the displaced. While such analyses may use sophisticated techniques (epidemiological, econometric, or otherwise) to evaluate changing practices in a given location, only through comparison with either a similar unit of analysis or against national trends, does it become possible to isolate those effects that are indeed influx related. As this may not always be possible in situations in which humanitarian influxes often take place, this paper should serve as a warning to greet non-comparative analyses of refugee-affected areas, however compelling, with considerable skepticism.
